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reasoning of this Court, and ignores the holdings of the majority
of jurisdictions that indicate a psychotherapist owes a "duty" to
third persons who are not specifically identified. The duty exists
when

the therapist

knows, or should

know, using

appropriate

standards of care, that the patient's condition endangers others.
Finally, Valley erroneously attempts to retroactively apply
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14A-102 by suggesting it "codified" the common
law.

This attempt contradicts the principle that statutes cannot

be retroactively applied and contradicts the legislative intent of
the statute to permit recovery in cases like this.

The Utah

legislature in floor debate expressly acknowledged the "duty" of
the psychotherapist to exercise reasonable care and meet professional

standards

to

protect

even

unidentified

victims

from

dangerous patients and deliberately limited the statute to permit
a claim for the breach of the duty.
II.
ARGUMENT
A.

VALLEY'S PROCLAIMED INTEREST IN THIS CASE OF
PROTECTING ITS "MISSION" IS NOT FACTUALLY
SUPPORTED AND DEFIES ITS PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATION
TO PROTECT THE VICTIMS OF THE MENTALLY ILL.

1

Valley's injection of Utah Code Ann, § 78-14A-102 is
improper. The only remaining defendant in this case is Salt Lake
County Mental Health ("SLCMH") which did not raise or rely upon
this statute at all in the court below or in this Court. The
University of Utah Medical Center did raise the statute but then
settled. In a similar circumstance, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held it could not consider an argument by an amicus because
it was "not properly before us." National Com'n on Egg Nutrition
v. F.T.C., 570 F.2d. 157 (7th Cir. 1977).
-2-
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meet accepted standards to avoid assaults on innocent victims will
only serve to fulfill Valley's stated mission of promoting the
emotional and physical well being of the community.2
B.

VALLEY'S "ISSUES" DO NOT RECOGNIZE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SLCMH AND TRUJILLO AND THE STATUS
OF SHAUNDRA HIGGINS AS AN ENDANGERED VICTIM.

Valley's "Statement of Issues" sidesteps crucial and significant facts.

Valley casts the issue as whether a duty was owed to

take precautions to protect "an unidentified victim."
Brief at 3).

(Valley

In framing the issue this way, Valley does not

acknowledge that throughout the 70's and early to mid-1980's,
Trujillo received both voluntary and involuntary in-patient and
out-patient treatment from SLCMH, and that during this period she
incessantly displayed violent behavior.

Nor does the "issue"

properly conform to the standard applied by the majority of cases
that does not require the victim be "identified" as a prerequisite
to liability.

As shown below, the courts allow recovery by

unidentified victims endangered by the risk engendered by the
patient's condition.

2

Valley's appearance as an amicus curiae is a way for SLCMH,
the predecessor-in-interest to Valley, to argue its case twice.
Valley's appearance really serves as an example of the misapplication of governmental immunity principles by Appellee SLCMH.
SLCMH has consistently argued that it is entitled to "governmental
immunity."
This argument denies that "governmental immunity"
applies where a function is undertaken "which only government can
perform." Standiford v. Salt Lake City, 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980).
Since Appellant's claims arise out of activities that can be
performed by non-governmental entities like Valley, a private
corporation, and since those activities are not exclusively
"governmental," there can be no immunity. See Schultz v. Conger,
755 P.2d 165 (Utah 1988).
-4-
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Further, despite Valley's recognition that the facts which are
relevant to the issue of duty must be considered in the light most
favorable to Shaundra and Kathy Higgins, Valley purposely avoids a
critical fact when it suggests that Caroline Trujillo was stimulated to attack Shaundra Higgins by "voices" which instructed her to
"hurt someone."

(Valley Brief at 5).

Although there is one

instance where Caroline Trujillo stated this, the overwhelming
evidence shows Trujillo was preoccupied with Kathy and Shaundra
Higgins for months preceding the attack on Shaundra and responded
to a voice telling her to stab Shaundra. Trujillo was interviewed
after the stabbing by Jean A. Nohava, a psychologist at the Utah
State Hospital.

Trujillo told psychologist Nohava that:

[Approximately 6 months prior to the incident, this young girl (a neighbor) had beaten
up her daughter, a 10-year old. She stated
that this girl and her mother would pass the
house and laugh at Caroline. She stated that
at one time she observed the mother stick her
tongue out at her. Caroline relates that she
spent much of her time by herself, and that
she brooded a great deal about the aforementioned incidents.
On the day of the attack, Caroline states
that she was thinking about this and was
getting quite agitated as she worried over it.
She states that one of her 'voices' told her
what to do. . . .
Upon the suggestion of the 'voice' which
told her to get a knife and stab the child,
she obtained a knife and began walking towards
the victim's house. She saw the little girl
leaving her house, walking in the opposite
direction, so she ran after her and attacked
her.
Caroline maintains that she was not
trying to kill the little girl, only to hurt
her and her mother.
She continues to see
nothing wrong with her action. She expressed
the thought that it was not an 'evil deed' and
-6-

that she would most likely do the same thing
again under the same circumstances.
[R. at
2067-2068].
Trujillo

made

similar

statements

psychiatrists after the stabbing.

to

other

psychologists

and

She told Dr. Robert J. Howell,

Ph.D., that "she knew this girl and this girl had been beating up
on her daughter and so she stabbed the girl."

[R. at 652].

Trujillo also told Dr. Allen Jeppson, a psychiatrist, that "the
victim had previously hurt her daughter by hitting her," that "if
the girl hit her daughter again that she would stab her again" and
that "she wished she would have died."

[R. at 629].

In addition to the facts asserted by Valley, there are also
material facts relating to Utah Code Ann., § 78-14(a)-102 (Supp.
1988) which Valley argues should be retroactively applied in this
case.

These undisputed facts are:
1. The cause of action upon which the Appellant brought this

case arose on or before April 10, 1984.
2.

Four years later, the legislature enacted U.C.A. § 78-

14(a)-101 et seq., which is attached to Valley's brief (hereinafter
"the Utah Act"). The Utah Act did not become effective until April
25, 1988, pursuant to Utah Constitution, Article 6, Section XXV.
3.

As originally drafted as House Bill No. 2, the Utah Act,

followed and used a California statute as a model, which granted
total immunity to psychotherapists from violent acts of their
patients

except

in situations where the patient communicated

violence against a reasonably identifiable victim.

-7-

[R. at 1778].

4.
11

The original wording of House Bill No. 2 provided that

[A] therapist is immune from liability and no cause of action

arises against him for failure to predict, warn, or take precautions to provide protection from any violent behavior of his client
or patient, unless that client or patient communicated to the
therapist an actual threat of physical violence against a clearly
identified or reasonably identifiable victim."

[R. at 1820].

5. House Bill No. 2 was objected to by representative Stanley
Smedley as being broader than its stated purpose.

In the floor

debate, Representative Smedley and the sponsor, Representative
Arrington had the following exchange:
[Representative Smedley:] To the sponsor and
then could I reserve the right to suggest a
possible amendment. The concern I have, my
understanding is that the desire you would
have is if a patient receives a threat, for
instance, to someone's life, that therapist
may go through certain procedures to notify
the authorities or that individual if the
threat has been made, the therapist would then
be relieved from obligation or liability. Is
that correct?
[Representative Arrington:]
pose of the bill.

That's the pur-

[Representative Smedley:] Okay. The concern
I would have then is the bill seems to go far
beyond that as I see it, in that it releases a
therapist from any liability of any kind
regardless of what may take place in the
course of his counseling and then it goes on
to say that if a threat is made he's released
from liability if he notifies certain individuals. As an example, if a therapist is over a
person in a state institution, such as the
State Hospital, he makes a recommendation that
the person be released from care and his
recommendation is a really poorly evaluated
decision.
That person then goes back into
society and creates an offense which other
-8-

therapists would look at and say he never
should have been released.
It seems to me
that the person who is injured should have a
right to say to that therapist: "You have a
responsibility and an obligation to society
and your profession to act within a certain
standard of care." But this bill seems to
absolve him from any responsibility of any
kind, as I see it.
[Representative Arrington:] I don't think it
does, no.
You are talking about something
that is not included. You know your standard
of care. If a therapist or a doctor whoever
might be willfully disregards the safety of
society or individuals there isn't a law in
the world that protects him from that. And
your standard of work ethic and the ethics of
the professions would preclude any immunity
from liability of something of that nature.
[Representative Smedley:] I think that this
bill does that very thing, though, Irby and
that's the concern I have, is that it cuts off
any responsibility that the therapist has. . .
[R. at 1824-1828].
6.

Pursuant to the objection in floor debate, the bill was

tabled in order for it to be amended to remove the broad immunity
from liability, and was redrafted to apply only to the fact
situation referred to in the statute.

[R. at 1822; Aff'd of

Representative Stan Smedley; R. at 1835].
D.

THE EXISTENCE AND SCOPE OF "DUTY" IS A LEGAL
ISSUE DEPENDENT UPON THE FACTS IN THE RECORD.

Valley asserts that this Court's decision on the existence and
scope of duty can be made without considering the quality of
"medical" care provided by SLCMH.

(Valley Brief at 4 ) .

This

assertion ignores that SLCMH exerted "control" over Trujillo by its
"medical care."

There is no dispute that SLCMH breached profes-9-

sional standards by failing to admit Trujillo to its in-patient
unit and "discharging" her into the same environment where she had
committed the prior stabbing.
Ignoring the medical care also allows Valley to avoid the fact
that Trujillofs medical treatment resulted in the stabbing.

The

record clearly shows SLCMH did not administer the medications that
it prescribed and knew were necessary for treatment of Trujillo's
violence and psychotic state.

Not only is it appropriate to

consider the medical care, it is necessary to fully consider
Appellant's claims.
Further, Valley's repeated suggestion that Trujillo was a
"voluntary patient" myopically denies her history with SLCMH. That
history demonstrates an association over nine years with "voluntary" and "involuntary placements."

As noted by the Appellant in

her Reply to SLCMH, the "status" of Trujillo on the day of the
stabbing as being "voluntary" does not eliminate "duty."

(Appel-

lant's Reply to SLCMH at 13-15).
Moreover, this Court has expressly recognized the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 315 can impose a duty to control a person. See
Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1989). The Owens case
was recently cited in Mahomes-Vinson v. U.S., 751 F. Supp. 913 (D.
Kan.

1990), where the court applied the "special relationship"

theory to a case like this where the assailant was "voluntary" on
the day of the assault but had a long psychiatric history that
included "involuntary" commitments.

Particularly important, the

court also considered Hokansen v. United States, 868 F.2d 372 (10th
-10-

Cir. 1989), the federal case interpreting Kansas law upon which
SLCMH relies to claim no duty is owed when the patient is "voluntary." Despite Hokansen, the court in Mahomes-Vinson still allowed
recovery in Kansas under the special relationship analysis.

The

court writes at 920:
A majority of jurisdictions have recognized a
duty to control pursuant to § 315. Under the
Restatement approach, the psychotherapist/
patient relationship has been found to be a
sufficient basis for imposing an affirmative
duty on the therapist for the benefit of third
persons. See, e.g., Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d
1064 (Del. 1988) (psychiatrist-discharged
mental patient); Bradley Center, Inc. v.
Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 296 S.E.2d 693 (1982)
(mental health hospital-outpatient); Evans v.
Morehead Clinic, 749 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1988)
(psychotherapist-discharged mental patient);
Duval v. Golden, 139 Mich. App. 342, 362
N.W.2d 275 (1984) (psychiatrist-outpatient);
Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hospital and
Health Center, 529 N.E.2d 449 (Ohio 1988)
(psychiatrist-outpatient); Peck v. Counseling
Serv. , 146 Vt. 61, 499 A.2d 422 (1985) (mental
health hospital/counselor-outpatient); c.f.
Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999 (D.
Md. 1982) (psychiatrist-outpatient); Fischer
v. Metcalf, 543 So.2d 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (psychiatrist-outpatient).
Valley does not mention this long line of cases.

Instead,

Valley erroneously asserts that decisions from this Court that do
not address the psychotherapist/patient relationship have analyzed
the scope of the "special relation" theory to hold in other cases
"that no duty was owed" to control or warn (Valley Brief at 10) and
that there can be no "relationship" giving rise to a cognizable
duty "unless a specific victim is identified."
11.)
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(Valley Brief at

Valley overstates its argument and its conclusions cannot be
fairly derived from this Court's decisions.

For example, Valley

erroneously claims that the Court analyzed the scope of the
"special relation" exception in Christensen v. Hayward, 694 P.2d
612 (Utah 1984) and Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989).
Even a cursory reading of Christensen shows the Court did not
address the "special relationship" analysis. Christensen addressed
a factual circumstance in which a police officer did not arrest an
intoxicated motorcyclist prior to his fatal accident.

The Court

specifically indicated the facts before it were different than
those concerning injuries to third parties.

694 P.2d at 614.

Likewise, Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989) is not a
"special relationship" case under the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 315.

Ferree is a parole custody case in which a wrongful death

claim against the State of Utah Board of Corrections was made.
Ferree examined the "duty" owed by a governmental agency and its
agents to protect the public against injury by a parolee who had no
history of violence.

The Court, in reaching the conclusion that

liability should not be imposed on corrections officials, relied
upon the factual circumstances that the parolee had "no prior
history of violence or of making threats, and corrections officials
had no reason to know of any physical threat that [the parolee]
might pose to a victim." 784 P.2d at 152.
Ferree is distinguishable from this case for several obvious
reasons.

First, unlike Ferree, there are no sound, public policy

reasons to preclude liability of mental health care providers,
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especially where the duty imposed is to diagnose and treat the
patient within the parameters set by accepted standards in the
profession.

Second, in this case, Trujillo had an extensive and

well-documented history of violence.

If proper diagnostic and

treatment procedures had been followed, her condition and violent
propensities would have been properly evaluated and the required
steps to protect her victims could have been taken.
Finally, Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989) does not
aid Valley.

Owens recognized there is a duty to control under the

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315. In Owens, the Court concluded, and the plaintiff conceded, that there was not a sufficiently
close relationship between an unlicensed babysitter and the State
for there to be a "special relationship" under Section 315. 784
P.2d at 1189. In reaching this conclusion, the Court specifically
compared the association between the babysitter and the State with
the

close

"special

relationship"

of

the

state

hospital

and

psychiatrist and a discharged patient in the case of Petersen v.
State, 100 Wash.2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983).

Petersen affirmed a

claim made by a member of the public who had been injured when a
mental patient purposely drove into the victim's car. The Washington Supreme Court squarely held the psychiatrist had a duty to
protect "any person who might foreseeably be endangered" by the
patient's condition.

100 Wash.2d at 428-29, 671 P.2d at 237.

Valley also argues from Owens and Ferree that there is no duty
owed unless a specific victim is identified.

Owens and Ferree do

not so narrowly limit "duty." As demonstrated in Appellant's Reply
-13-

to SLCMH, Owens recognized that a police officer detaining an
intoxicated driver may owe duty to unidentified third parties. In
this circumstance, it is the ability, either practically or as a
matter of statute, to control the dangerous person that defines the
duty.

In Ferree, the Court focused on the fact that the parolee,

while in the control of the State, was not known to be dangerous or
even have the potential to be dangerous and there "was no reason"
to suspect the parolee to be violent "toward a particular person or
a particular type of person."

784 P.2d at 152.

A careful analysis of these opinions shows the Court did not
impose the requirement that a victim be "identified," especially
where the assailant is violent and there is a right or ability to
control the patient.

Indeed, the Court has permitted claims by

unidentified third parties when the assailant has a history of
violence and the ability to control exists.

See, e.g., Doe v.

Arquelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985).
In many ways the Court's analysis in these cases is consistent
with that employed in the jurisdictions that have recognized the
"duty" of psychotherapist/mental health care providers. See, e.g.,
Mahomes-Vinson v. U.S., 751 F. Supp. 913, 923 (D. Kan. 1990) (duty
owed by V.A. hospital and psychotherapist to persons endangered by
the patient's condition and not limited to "identified" victims);
Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198, 1214 (Colo. 1989) (the absence of
specific threats or overt violent behavior is not necessarily
conclusive in that a psychiatrist is obliged to take reasonable
precautions, consistent with accepted psychiatric standards of
-14-

practice, to protect potential victims from the patient's propensity for violence); Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1072 (Del. 1988)
(duty requires the psychiatrist or other mental health professional
to initiate whatever precautions

are reasonably

necessary to

protect potential victims of the patient); Petersen v. State, 671
P.2d 230 (Wash. 1983) (duty to protect victims endangered by the
patient's condition); Mcintosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super, at 489,
403 A.2d at 511-12 (psychiatrist or therapist may have a duty to
take whatever steps are reasonably necessary to protect a potential
victim of his patient).
The criteria employed in these cases leads to the conclusion
that Shaundra Higgins was owed "duty."

Shaundra Higgins was

a

neighbor about whom Trujillo had brooded, and the stabbing of her
followed a nearly identical stabbing.

As a result of the first

stabbing, Trujillo was sentenced to the care and custody of SLCMH
which knew of the prior similar stabbing.
Shaundra was also a person that the Utah mental health
statutes are designed to protect. The statutes expressly indicate
that a psychotherapist may exercise control over a patient that is
a "danger" to others. For example, the Utah mental health statutes
in 1984 provided for admission of a voluntary patient for care and
observation. Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-29 stated that a "mental health
facility [SLCMH was so designated] . . . may admit for observation,
diagnosis, care and treatment any individual who is mentally ill or
who has symptoms of mental illness . . . "
Ann. § 64-7-31 allowed

In addition, Utah Code

for SLCMH to exercise control over a
-15-

voluntary patient to restrict release of a voluntary patient if it
was "unsafe for the patient or others."

SLCMH could have refused

to discharge Trujillo if she demanded release for up to 48 hours
during which time SLCMH could have tried to persuade her to be
hospitalized

by

voluntary

admission, or

commitment procedures could be commenced.

so

that

involuntary

Utah law specifically

provided that if a patient was a danger to self or others, there
was a basis for an involuntary commitment. Utah Code Ann., § 64-734 and 36.3
In this case, Caroline Trujillo voluntarily sought hospitalization prior to the stabbing.

The concern of infringing on her

"liberty" interest evaporated. Because she was obviously psychotic
and had a well-documented history of violence, SLCMH only had to
admit her to its in-patient unit where control is implicit.

See

Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hospital and Health Center, 529 N.E.2d
449, 460 (Ohio 1988) (discussing duty in a voluntary hospitalization context).

See also Hamman v. County of Maricopa, 775 P.2d

1122 (Ariz. 1989) (affidavits from experts, like those submitted in
this case, required issue of control and ability to control to be
resolved at trial).

Instead, SLCMH negligently controlled her by

admitting her at ARTU and discharging her to the Higginsf neighborValley's argument that "duty" should not be imposed due to
the inability to predict "dangerousness" belies the thrust of the
mental health statutes which requires a prediction of dangerousness
for involuntary commitment.

The heart of the statutes require a

"prediction" and to hold that the standard is uncertain raises
serious questions as to the entire basis for commitment.

Schuster

v. Altenberq, 424 N.W.2d at 169; Mcintosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d at
514.
-16-

hood.

Even if Trujillo had resisted hospitalization, SLCMH could

have admitted her by "involuntary commitment." See Mahomes-Vinson
v. U.S., 751 F. Supp. 913, 922, n.14 (D. Kan. 1990).
E.
1.

PUBLIC POLICY RECOGNIZES THE DUTY OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS TO PROTECT OTHERS.

The Predominant Policy Allows For a Victim To Recover
Where Professional Standards are Breached.
Valley's

"public

policy"

arguments

do

not

mention

the

predominant policy advanced by the courts when addressing the duty
issue. Every thoughtful opinion, after carefully weighing "public
policy," concludes that innocent victims in certain circumstances
are entitled to be compensated for injuries caused by dangerous and
mentally ill patients.

The courts do not automatically impose

liability, but require the plaintiff, as she did in this case, to
show the psychotherapist did not use reasonable care, in accordance
with the knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed by psychiatric
practitioners under similar circumstances, to protect the victim
from future acts of violence by the patient.

See, generally,

Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. at 193; Naidu v.
Laird, 539 A.2d at 1072-73; Mcintosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super, at
489-90, 403 A.2d at 511-12; Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hospital
and Health Center, 39 Ohio St. 3d 86, 99, 529 N.E.2d 449, 460
(1988); Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d at 428, 671 P.2d at 237;
Schuster v. Altenberq, 144 Wis. 2d at 268-69, 424 N.W.2d at 174.
The legitimate policy of allowing victims to recover in these
circumstances was acknowledged by the Utah State Legislature when
it considered the Therapist Liability Act enacted in 1988 at Utah
-17-

Code Ann, § 78-14(a)-101, et seq., which Valley wrongfully suggests
"codified the common law" to preclude recovery.4

At the core of

Valley's argument is the misconception that the statute's "policy"
supports SLCMH.

A careful reading of the legislative history of

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14(a)-102 and the affidavit of Senator Stan
Smedley who was instrumental in the passing of the statute [R. at
1835] shows that if any "policy" was codified, it was the policy of
permitting victims to recover where generally recognized professional standards of care are not met in the treatment of violent
and mentally ill patients, and injury to the innocent victim
results.
The floor debates for this statute make this clear. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14(a)-102 was debated and narrowly redrafted in order to
only address the specific question of a therapist's duty in a
situation where the therapist receives information about a threat
of violence.

The statute was never meant to confer a blanket

immunity from liability to a psychotherapist/mental health provider
that fell below the standard of care and refused to admit and

4

The statute did not become effective until April 25, 1988,
over four years after Appellant's cause of action accrued.
Valley's interpretation of the statute to eliminate Appellant's
claim violates the principle that the statute cannot be retroactively applied. Stevens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952, 953-54 (Utah
1987). The courts in other jurisdictions where legislatures have
passed statutes that broadly provide for "immunity," which our
legislature refused to do, have not given the statutes any
retroactive application either directly or by retroactive application of policy. See, e.g., Michael E. L. v. County of San Diego,
228 Cal. Rptr. 139, 183 Cal. App. 3d 525 (Cal. App. 4th Dist.
1986); and Evans v. Morehead Clinic, 749 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1988).
-18-

properly treat a dangerous psychotic who presented a danger to
"society or individuals."5
Rather than address this dominant "policy/1 Valley claims that
"duty" should not be imposed due to concerns of treating the
mentally ill in a "least restrictive setting," the "difficulty of
predicting dangerousness" and the desire to avoid detention of the
mentally ill.

Not one of these "policies" have convinced the

courts to not impose duty.
2.

Imposing Duty Does Not Conflict With the Policy of
Placing a Patient in the Least Restrictive Environment.
Valley's contention that imposing "duty" conflicts with the

goal of placing mental patients in the least restrictive environment is misplaced.
The "liberty" interest of Caroline Trujillo is not an issue in
this case.

The record is absolutely clear that Trujillo and her

family made numerous attempts to have Trujillo hospitalized. There
is no concern that her "freedom" would have been jeopardized if

5

Valley's suggestion that the statute "codified the common
law," to protect a psychotherapist unless there is an identified
victim is wrong. The legislature originally considered a model
California statute which was designed to eliminate the California
common law and grant total immunity to psychotherapists from
violent acts of patients, except in situations where the patient
communicated violence against a "reasonably identifiable" victim.
As a result of the strong objection on the Utah legislature floor,
that the statute was too broad and would potentially relieve a
therapist who breached standards of care, the legislature deliberately redrafted the statute to apply only to the fact situation
referred to in the statute. If anything, the statute "codified"
the common law that a therapist must meet the standard of care in
evaluating and treating a violent patient and in protecting her
victims.
-19-

SLCMH had followed the standard of care and met Trujillo's and her
family•s requests.
Furthermore, Valley's contention misinterprets the nature of
the duty imposed on the therapist. The recognition of "duty" does
not make the therapist liable for any harm caused by the patient,
but "makes him liable when his negligent treatment of the patient
caused the injury in question."

Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,

497 F. Supp. 185, 192 (D. Neb. 1980).
Moreover, there is no factual support for Valley's claim.

In

Schuster v. Altenberq, 424 N.W.2d 159, 175 (Wis. 1988) the Court
specifically addressed the suggestion that the imposition of "duty"
since the landmark case of Tarasoff v. Regents of California, 551
P. 2d 334 (Cal. 1976) has led to increased use of involuntary
commitments of patients:
[D]ata collected in a survey of the impact of
Tarasoff demonstrated that 'Tarasoff has not
discouraged therapists from treating dangerous
patients, nor has it led to an increased use
of involuntary commitment of patients perceived as dangerous.' Givelber, Bowers and
Blitch, Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law In Action, 1984 Wis.
L. Rev., supra at 486. See, also, Melella,
Travin and Cullen, supra p. 171, at 100 . . .
Likewise, we have considered the legislative
policy . . . which seeks to provide for the
'least restrictive treatment . . .' As to this
concern, we find the rationale articulated by
the court in Lipari compelling:
The recognition of this duty does
not make the psychotherapist liable
for any harm caused by his patient,
but rather makes him liable only
when his negligent treatment of the
patient caused the injury in question. . . . 'Thus, despite the defendant's protest to the contrary, a
-20-

psychotherapist is not subject to
liability for placing his patient in
a less restrictive environment, so
long as he uses due care in assessing the risks of such a placement.
This duty is no greater than the
duty already owing to the patient.1
497 F. Supp. at 192-93
Finally, the mere initiation of detention or
commitment proceedings does not threaten the
patient's constitutionally protected liberty.
[The commitment statute] assures a constitutionally proper procedure which must be followed in order to secure the emergency detention or commitment of an individual.
Thus, despite Valley's argument, a psychotherapist will not be
liable for placing a patient in a less restrictive environment, so
long as due care is used in assessing the risks of the placement.
Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at 192-93.

However, in a case like this,

where SLCMH was negligent in its decision to treat Trujillo at ARTU
and "discharge" her, and misled the Trujillos about "lack of bed
space," then there is no reason to not impose duty.
3.

The Alleged Difficulty of Predicting Dangerousness
Does Not Justify Denying the Victim Relief.
Similarly, Valley's notion that the difficulty in evaluating

dangerousness should bar a victim's recovery has not been accepted.
The recent Colorado opinion, Perreira v. State, 768 P. 2d 1198,
1213-14 (Colo. 1989) states the rationale for the express rejection
of Valley's claims:
A psychiatrist is not expected to render a
full proof prediction of future violence.
Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at 192. On the contrary,
'[t]he concept of due care in appraising
psychiatric problems, assuming proper procedures are followed, must take account of the
difficulty often inevitable in the definitive
diagnosis.' Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d
-21-

407, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1975). What is required
of the psychiatrist is to exercise the reasonable degree of skill and knowledge ordinarily
possessed by practicing psychiatrists in
arriving at an informed and realistic assessment of the patient's present mental condition
and propensity for violence so that an informed judgment can be made as to whether the
release of the patient will create an unreasonable risk of serious bodily harm to others.
See Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at 193; Durflinqer,
234 Kan. at 490-91, 673 P.2d at 92-93; Evans,
749 S.W.2d at 699.
In Schuster v. Altenberq, 424 N.W.2d 169 (Wis. 1988), another
recent decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court made the point quite
convincingly that psychiatrists can effectively evaluate dangerousness:
[a] survey of psychotherapists suggests that
practitioners are quite confident of their
ability to assess dangerousness. . . [t]he
task of assessing dangerousness is not viewed
as being beyond the competence of individual
therapists or as a matter upon which therapists cannot agree.
And, in Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1074 (Del. 1988), the court
rejected the Valley argument:
[T]he argument for the defense ignores the
fact that courts have recognized that under
some circumstances, psychiatrists and mental
hospitals may be held liable for failing to
predict the dangerous propensities of their
patients. See Hicks v. United States, D.C.
Cir., 511 F.2d 407, 415-17 (1975); Lipari v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., D. Neb. 497 F. Supp.
185, 191 (1980); Baker v. United States, S.D.
Iowa, 226 F. Supp. 129, 132-35 (1964), aff'd.
8th Cir. 343 F.2d 222 (1965); Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California, Cal.
supra, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 20,
551 P.2d 334, 340 (1976); Bradley Center, Inc.
v. Wessner, 166 Georgia App. 576, 287 S.E.2d
716, 720-21, afffd. Georgia, supra, 250 Ga.
199, 296 S.E.2d 693 (1982); Rum River Lumber
Company v. State, M. Super. 282 N.W.2d 882,
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885 (1979); Mcintosh v. Milano, N.J. Super.,
168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500, 511 (1979);
Peterson v. State, Wash. Super., 100 Wash. 2d
421, 671 P.2d 230, 237 (1983). Although we
recognize the inherent difficulty confronted
by mental health professionals in determining
whether a patient imposes an unreasonable
threat of harm to himself or others, this
factor alone does not justify barring recovery
in all cases. Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
497 F. Supp. at 192.
4.

Imposition of Duty Does Not Lead to Unnecessary
Restrictive Detention.
Finally, Valley's argument that the imposition of "duty" will

lead to the unnecessary commitment of the mentally ill has no
support in the record. The same argument has been called "speculative at best," unsupported "by any reliable statistical data" and
rejected.

Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d at 1219 (citing Mcintosh v.

Milano, 168 N.J. Supp. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979) . See also Schuster
v. Altenberq, 434 N.W.2d 159, 175 (Wis. 1988); Lipari v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. at 192-93 (citations omitted).
F.

BRADY V. HOPPER DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE.

Valley mistakenly relies upon Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp.
1333 (D. Colo. 1983), aff'd. 750 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984) as the
"best" case to examine duty.

Brady, a relatively early case in a

developing area of the law, does not hold, as Valley suggests, that
the special relationship analysis results in the conclusion that
there can never be "duty."

Brady indicates that the psycho-

therapist/patient relationship does create a legal duty in favor of
third persons:
It is implicit in the majority of cases in
this area that the therapist/patient relation-23-

ship is one which under certain circumstances
will give rise to a duty on the part of the
therapist to protect third persons from harm.
•

*

•

Moreover, the doctor-patient relationship
between Dr. Hopper and Hinckley was one which
gave rise to certain duties on the part of Dr.
Hopper.
570 F. Supp. at 1338.
Thus, Brady explicitly holds that a duty is owed but finds
that under the case's unique fact situation that there was no
breach of duty.
Furthermore, Brady is a 1983 federal district court case that
interpreted Colorado law before the Colorado courts had examined
the "duty" issue.

The language in Brady to which Valley now

clings, "specific threats to specific victims," was not followed by
the Colorado Supreme Court.

In Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198

(Colo. 1989), the court factually distinguished Brady from cases
such as this one by pointing out that Brady fell into the least
duty-intensive cases because Hinckley was not seeking hospitalization, had no history of prior violent propensities, and had never
made overt threats against anyone. Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d at
1210.
Other jurisdictions have also refused to follow Brady.

For

example, the Arizona Supreme Court recently reversed an Arizona
intermediate court that adopted the Brady test of specific threats
and identified victims. In Hamman v. County of Maricopa, 161 Ariz.
58, 775 P.2d 1122 (Ariz. 1989), the Arizona Supreme Court writes:
-24-

We believe the Brady approach is too narrow.
Tarasoff envisioned a broader scope of a
psychiatrist's duty when the court stated:
'[o]nce a therapist does in fact determine, or
under applicable professional standards reasonably should have determined, that a patient
poses a serious danger of violence to others,
he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to
protect the foreseeable victim of that danger.
17 Cal. 3d at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal.
Rptr. at 25.
Additionally, we agree with
those cases interpreting Tarasoff which state
that a psychiatrist should not be relieved of
this duty merely because his patient never
verbalized any specific threat.
Id. at 1127. Appellant respectfully asserts Brady is too narrow,
does not comport with the majority of cases, and should not be
followed.
CONCLUSION
The common law and social policy all provide that SLCMH owed
duty to Shaundra and Kathy Higgins as victims endangered by
Trujillo's dangerous and psychotic condition.

The trial court's

judgment should therefore be reversed in this Court and the case
should be remanded for trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

17

day of April, 1991.

CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW

Rodney G. Snow
Neil A. Kaplan
James L. Warlaumont
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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64-7-29

STATE INSTITUTIONS

(11) The word "designee'' moans a physician who lias responsibility for
medical functions including admission, treatment, and discharge.
History: 0. 1943, 85-7-55, enacted by
L. 1951, ch. 113, §3; L. 1971, ch. 172, §4;
1975, ch. 198, § 16.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1971 amendment substituted "in a
mental health facility" for "in a hospital
pursuant to this act" at the end of subsec. (2); substituted "or" for "and" before "a medical officer" in subsec. (3);
substituted "division of mental health"
for "department of public welfare" in
subsec. (4); added subsecs. (5) and (6);
and made minor changes in style.
The 1975 amendment substituted numerical for lettered designations of subsections; substituted subsec. (1) for former

subsec. (a) which read: "The words 'mentally ill individual' mean an individual
having a psychiatric or other disease
which substantially impairs his mental
health"; inserted "preferably a psychiatrist" near the beginning of subsec. (4),
and added to the end of the first sentence
of subsec. (4) "or another licensed mental
health professional * * * in the treatment
of mental or related illness" and added
the last two sentences to subsec. (4);
added subsecs. (7) to (11); and made
minor changes in punctuation.
Cross-Reference.
Limitation of application as to criminally insane, 64-7-54.

64-7-29. Admission of voluntary patient for observation or care—Age
of patient.—The superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or director of
a mental health facility or either of their designees may admit for observation, diagnosis, care, and treatment any individual who is mentally ill or
has symptoms of mental illness and who, being sixteen years of age or
over, applies therefor, and any individual under sixteen years of age
who is mentally ill or has symptoms of mental illness, if his parent or legal
guardian applies therefor in his behalf.
No person over sixteen years of age may be hospitalized or continue to
be hospitalized against his will, except as provided in this chapter.
History: C. 1943, 85-7-56, enacted by L,
1951, en. 113, §3; L. 1971, ch. 172, §5;
1975, ch. 198, § 17.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1971 amendment inserted "or director of a mental health facility" after
"superintendent of the Utah State Hospital" at the beginning of the section.

The 1975 amendment inserted "or either
of their designees" near the beginning of
the section; and added the second paragraph.
Cross-Reference.
Limitation of application as to criminally insane, 64-7-54.

64-7-30. Discharge of patient.—The superintendent or director of a
mental health facility shall discharge any patient who in the opinion of
the superintendent or director, has recovered and may discharge any
patient whose hospitalization is determined to be no longer advisable
except as provided by section 78-3a-40, but an effort shall be made to
assure that any further supportive services required to meet the patient's
needs upon release will be provided. If the patient has been hospitalized
under judicial proceedings, procedures under 64-7-42 and 64-7-43 shall be
followed.
History: c. 1943, 85-7-57, enacted by
L. 1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1975, ch. 198, § 18.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1975 amendment rewrote this section which read: "The superintendent of
the hospital shall discharge any voluntary

patient who has recovered and may discharge any voluntary patient whose hospitalization he determines to be no longer
advisable."
Cross-Beferences.
Application for release by one commit-
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64-7-31

ted after having boon found not guilty of
crime by reason of insanity, 77-24-16.
Limitation of application as to criminally insane, 64-7-54.

7 C.J.S. Asylums § 7; 41 C.J.S. Hospitals
§ 7; 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 72.
41 Am. Jur. 2d 583-586, Incompetent
Persons §§ 44-48.

Collateral References.
Asylums<£»5; Hospitals@=>5; M e n t a l
Health^»59.

Habeas corpus on ground of restoration
to sanity of one confined as an incompotent other than in connection with
crime, 21 A. L. R. 2d 1004.

64-7-31. Release of voluntary patient.—A voluntary patient who requests release or whose release is requested, in writing, by the patient's
legal guardian, parent, spouse, or adult next of kin shall be released
forthwith except that:
(1) If the patient were admitted on the patient's own application and
the request for release is made by a person other than the patient, release
may be conditioned upon the agreement of the patient thereto, and
(2) If the patient, by reason of age, was admitted on the application
of another person, any release prior to becoming sixteen years of age may
be conditioned upon the consent of the patient's parent or guardian, and
(3) If the superintendent or director of the mental health facility
or either of their designees is of the opinion that release of a patient would
be unsafe for the patient or others, release of the patient may be postponed
for up to 48 hours excluding weekends and holidays provided that the
superintendent or director or either of their designees must cause to be
instituted involuntary hospitalization proceedings with the district court
within the specified time period unless cause no longer exists for instituting
such proceedings. Written notice of such denial with the reasons for
such denial must be given to the patient without undue delay. No judicial
proceedings shall be commenced with respect to a voluntary patient unless
release of the patient has been requested by the patient or, if under the
age of sixteen, by the patient's parent or guardian.
History: C. 1943, 86-7-58, enacted by
L. 1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2;
1971, ch. 172, § 6 [ a ] ; 1975, ch. 198, §19.
Compilex'8 Notes.
The 1953 amendment deleted the subsection designation " ( a ) " before the present
introductory paragraph; added a proviso
to subd. (3) which was essentially the
fourth paragraph formerly designated as
"(b)"; deleted "Notwithstanding any other
provision of this act" from the beginning
of the proviso; and made a minor change
in phraseology.
The 1971 amendment deleted "of the
hospital" after "superintendent" and inserted "or director of the mental health
facility" in subd. (3).
The 1975 amendment rewrote subd. (3),
which read: "If the superintendent or director of the mental health facility, within
forty-eight hours from the receipt of the
request, files with the district court or a
judge thereof a certification that in his

opinion the release of the patient would
be unsafe for the patient or others, release
may be postponed on application for as
long as the court or a judge hereof determines to be necessary for the commencement of proceedings for judicial hospitalization, but in no event for more than five
days, provided that judicial proceedings
for hospitalization shall not be commenced
with respect to a voluntary patient unless
release of the patient has been requested
by himself or the individual who applied
for his admission"; and made numerous
changes in phraseology and punctuation.
Laws 1951, ch. 113 added two sections
appearing in Code 1943, Supp. numbered
identically as 85-7-58. The sections are
compiled herein as 64-7-31 and 64-7-32.
Laws 1971, ch. 172, contained two sections designated as "section 6."
Cross-Reference.
Limitation of application as to criminally insane, 64-7-54.
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Collateral References.
AsvlurasG=>5; Hospitais@=»5; M e n t a l
Health<§=>59.
7 C.J.S. Asylums § 7; 41 C.J.S. Hospitals
§ 7; 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 72.
41 Am. Jur. 2d 583-586, Incompetent
Persons SS 44-48.

Habeas ooipus on ground of restoration
to sanitv of one connned as an incompetent other than m connection with
crime, 21 A. L. B. 2d 1004.

64-7-32. Involuntary hospitalization procedures.—The following ways
are available for involuntary hospitalization:
(1) Emergency procedures for temporary hospitalization.
(a) Hospitalization on medical certification; emergency procedure.
(b) Hospitalization without endorsement of medical certification; emergency procedure.
(2) Hospitalization on court order; judicial procedure.
History: C. 1943, 85-7-58, enacted by L.
1951, ch. 113, § 3 ; L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2 ;
1971, ch. 172, § 6 0 3 ; 1975, cfc. 198, §20.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1953 amendment made no change
in this section.
The 1971 amendment deleted "of the
hospital" alter "superintendent" and inserted "or director of the mental health
facility" at the beginning of the former
introductory paragraph; and made a minor
change in phraseology.
The 1975 amendment substituted "The
following ways are available for involuntary hospitalization" at the beginning of
the section for "The superintendent or
director of mental health facility is authorized to receive therein for observation, diagnosis, care, and treatment any
individual whose admission is applied for
under any of the following procedures";
inserted "Emergeny procedures for tem-

porary hospitalization" at the beginning
of subsec. (1); deleted former subd. (a)
which read: "Hospitalization on medical
certification; standard nonjudicial procedure"; redesignated former subds. (b)
and (c) as qubds. (lHa) and Cl)(b): and
redesignated former subd. (d) as subsec.
(2).
Laws 1971, ch. 172, contained two sections designated as "section 6."
Cross-References.
Criminal prosecutions, inquiry into defendant's sanity, 77-24-15, 77-48-1 et seq.,
77-49-1 et seq.
Limitation of application as to criminally insane, 64-7-54.
Collateral References.
Mental Health<§=>37-46.
44 C.J.S. Insane Persons §§ 14-34.
41 Am. Jur. 2d 547-564, 577-582, Incompetent Persons §§ 8-25, 39-42.

64-7-33. Repealed.
Repeal.
Section 64-7-33 (C. 1943, 85-7-59, enacted
by L. 1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1953, ch. 124,
§ 2; 1963, ch. 159, § 1; 1967, ch. 174, § 130;

1971, ch. 172, § 7), relating to admission
to the Utah State Hospital on certification
by examiners was repealed bv Laws 1975,
ch. 198, § 35.

64-7-34. Admission to mental health facility—Requirements and procedure—Costs.—(1) Any individual may be admitted to a mental health
facility upon:
(a) Written application by a responsible friend, relative, spouse, or
guardian of the individual, a mental health or peace officer, or the head of
any institution as defined in section 64-7-28 stating belief that the individual
is likely to cause injury to himself, herself or others if not immediately
restrained, and the grounds for such belief, and
(b) A certification by at least one licensed physician that the physician
has examined the individual within a three-day period immediately pre572
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ceding said certification and is of the opinion that the individual is
mentally ill and, because of the individual's illness, is likely to injure himself, herself or others if not immediately restrained.
(c) Such a certificate upon endorsement for such purpose by a judge
of the district court or a member of the board of county commissioners of
the county in which the individual is present, shall authorize any mental
health or peace officer to take the individual into custody and transport
the individual to a mental health facility.
(2) If a duly authorized mental health or peace officer observes a
person involved in conduct which leads the officer to have probable cause
to believe that such person is mentally ill, as defined by this act, and
that, because of such apparent mental illness and conduct, there is a substantial likelihood of serious harm to that person or to others pending proceedings for examination and certification as provided in this act, the
officer may take the person into protective custody. Immediately thereafter, the officer shall transport the person to a mental health facility and
there make application for the person's admission therein. The application
shall be upon a prescribed form and shall include the following:
(a) A statement by the officer that he believes on the basis of personal
observation that the person is, as a result of a mental illness, a danger to
self or others.
(b) The specific nature of the danger.
(c) A summary of the observations upon which the statement of
danger is based.
(d) A statement of facts which called the person to the attention of
the officer.
(3) Any person admitted under this section may be held for a maximum of 24 hours. At the expiration of 24 hours time the person shall be
considered a voluntary patient subject to the provisions of sections 647-29, 64-7-30 and 64-7-31 and notice of such status shall be given to the
patient.
(4) Costs of all proceedings under this section shall be paid by the
county in which such person is found unless the person is financially able
to pay the same in which event he shall pay.
History: C. 1943, 85-7-60, enacted by
L. 1951, ch. 113, § 3 ; L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2 ;
1963, ch. 159, § 1 ; 1971, ch. 172, § 8 ; 1975,
ch. 198, § 21.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1953 amendment inserted the reference to "a member of the board of countv
commissioners" in subsec. B.
The 1963 amendment rewrote the first
part of subd. A(l) which read: "Written application by any health or peace officer or by any other person stating his
belief ****."
The 1971 amendment substituted "a mental health facility" for "the Utah State
Hospital" in both subsecs. A and B.

The 1975 amendment rewrote this secturn which read: "A. Anv individual may
be admitted to a mental health facility
upon
"(1) Written application bv a friend,
relative, spouse, or guardian of the individual, a health or public welfare or peace
officer, or the head of anv institution as
defined in section 64-7-33 stating his belief
that the individual is likely to cause mjurv to himself or others if not lmmediatelv restrained, and the grounds for such
belief, and
"(2) A certification by at least one licensed phvsician that he has examined the
individual and is of the opinion that the
indiwdual is mentally ill and, because of
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his illness, is likely to injure himself or
others if not immediately restrained.
"An individual with respect to whom
such a certificate has been issued may be
admitted on the basis thereof at any time
before the expiration of three days after
the date of examination.
"B. Such a certificate, upon endorsement for such purpose by the head of a
local board of health, a judge of the district court or a member of the board of
county commissioners of the county m
which the individual is present, shall authorize any health or peace officer to take
the individual into custody and transport
him to a mental health facility."

Cross-Beference.
Limitation of application as to crimin a lly insane, 64-7-54.
Collateral References,
Mental Health^»37-46.
44 C.J.S. Insane Persons §§ 14-34.
41 Am. Jur. 2d 547-564, 577-582, Incompetent Persons §§ 8-25, 39-42.
Ri M
without judicial proceeding
to
arre*t a n d d e t a i n o n e w h o \
o r is%ug.
t e d of bei
m e n t a l l v d e r a nged, 92

A L B 2d 570

64-7-35. Repealed.
Repeal
Section 64-7-35 (C. 1943, 85-7-61, enacted
by L. 1951, ch. 113, § 3 ; L. 1953, ch. 124,
§2; 1971, ch. 172, §9), relating to pro-

tective custody pending examination and
certification, was repealed by Laws 1975,
eh. 198, §35.

64-7-36. Involuntary hospitalization—Examination of patient—Hearing
—Power of court—Mental health commissioner, appointment and duties—
New hearing procedure — Costs. — (1) Proceedings for the involuntary
hospitalization of an individual may be commenced by the filing of a written
application with the district court of the county in which the proposed
patient resides or is found, by a responsible friend, relative, spouse or
guardian of the individual, or by a licensed physician, a mental health,
public welfare or peace officer, or the head of any public or private institution in which such individual may be. Any such application shall be
accompanied by a certificate of a licensed physician stating that within a
seven-day period immediately preceding the certification the physician
has examined the individual and is of the opinion that the individual is
mentally ill and should be hospitalized, or a written statement by the
applicant that the individual has been requested to but has refused to
submit to examination by a licensed physician. Said application shall be
sworn to under oath and shall state the facts upon which the application
is based. Prior to filing the application, the court may require the applicant
to consult a mental health facility or may direct a mental health professional from a mental health facility to interview the applicant and the
proposed patient to determine the existing facts and report them to the
court. Proceedings for the involuntary hospitalization of an individual
under the age of eighteen years who is under the continuing jurisdiction
of the juvenile court may be commenced by the filing of a written application with the juvenile court in accordance with the provisions of this
section and said court shall have jurisdiction to proceed in such case in
the same manner and with the same authority as the district court.
(2) Upon receipt of an application or the report the court shall give
written notice of the proceeding to the proposed patient, to the legal
guardian, if any, and to the spouse, parents, and nearest known other
relative or friend.
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Notice to the proposed patient shall srt forth the allegations of the
application and any reported facts.
If the court finds from the application and any reported facts that
there is probable cause that the proposed patient's mental condition requires hospitalization pending the hearing, the court shall order that the
proposed patient be taken to and detained in whatever mental health
facility or other location is most appropriate.
If there are no appropriate mental health resources within the district,
the court may in its discretion transfer the case to any other district court
within the state of Utah provided that said transfer will not be adverse
to the interest of the proposed patient.
(3) If the application avers that the proposed patient is in such
condition that the patient is in immediate danger of destroying property,
or injuring himself, herself, or others, or if the proposed patient has refused to submit to examination either upon request of the applicant or
upon interview with a mental health professional as directed by the court,
the court shall issue an order directed to any mental health or peace
officer to take the proposed patient forthwith to any mental health facility
for the purpose of an examination by two designated examiners as provided
in subsection (4). If a proposed patient refuses to submit to an examination by the designated examiners, the proposed patient shall promptly be
taken before a judge of a district court who shall advise the proposed
patient of proceedings filed for involuntary hospitalization and the requirements of the law and order the proposed patient to submit to such
examination if good cause appears therefor. If the individual refuses to
submit to such examination, the court may order that the proposed patient
be taken to a mental health facility and examined.
(4) Within twenty-four hours after the order for detention or examination is given, the court shall appoint two designated examiners to
examine the proposed patient. The examination shall be held at the home
of the proposed patient, a hospital or other medical facility, or at any
other suitable place not likely to have a harmful effect on the patient's
health. Said examiners shall orally or in writing report to the court their
findings as to the mental condition of the proposed patient within fortyeight hours after said appointment exclusive of weekends or holidays.
If the report is given orally, a written report shall thereafter be forwarded
to the court.
If the report of the designated examiners is to the effect that the
proposed patient is not mentally ill, the court may without taking any
further action terminate the proceedings and dismiss the application;
otherwise, it shall forthwith i\x a date for hearing to b<> held not more
than ten days from receipt of the initial report.
(5) At the hearing, an opportunity to be represented by counsel
shall be afforded to every proposed patient, and if neither the patient nor
others provide counsel, the court shall appoint counsel. In the case of an
indigent patient, the payment of reasonable attorneys fees for counsel
as determined by the court shall be made by the county in which the
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patient resides or was found. The proposed patient, tho applicant, and
all other persons to whom notice is required to be given shall be afforded
an opportunity to appear at the hearing, to testify, and to present and
cross-examine witnesses, and the court may in its discretion receive the
testimony of any other person. The court is authorized to exclude all
persons not necessary for the conduct of the proceedings. The hearing shall
be conducted in as informal a manner as may be consistent with orderly
procedure and in a physical setting not likely to have a harmful effect
on the mental health of the proposed patient. The court shall receive all
relevant and material evidence which may be offered subject to the rules
of evidence.
The mental health facility or the physician in charge of the patient's
care shall provide to the court at the time of the hearing the following
information: the admission notes, the diagnosis, any doctors' orders, the
progress notes, the nursing notes and the medication records pertaining
to the current hospitalization. Said information shall also be supplied to
the patient's counsel at the time of the hearing and at any time prior
thereto upon request.
(6) The court shall order hospitalization if, upon completion of the
hearing and consideration of the record, the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the proposed patient:
(a) Is mentally ill, and
(b) Because of the patient's illness there is an immediate danger that
the proposed patient will injure himself, herself or others if allowed to
remain at liberty, or
(c) Is in need of custodial care or treatment in a mental health
facility and, because of the patient's illness, either
(i) lacks sufficient insight to make responsible decisions as to the
need for care and treatment as demonstrated by evidence of unwillingness or inability to follow through with treatment, the need for said
treatment having been adequately demonstrated to the court, or
(ii) lacks sufficient capacity to provide himself or herself with the
basic necessities of life, and
(d) There is no appropriate less restrictive alternative to a court
order of hospitalization, and the court has determined that the hospital
or mental health facility in which the individual is to be hospitalized
pursuant to this act can provide the individual with treatment that is
adequate and appropriate to the individual's conditions and needs. In the
absence of the required findings of the court after the hearing, the court
shall forthwith dismiss the proceedings.
(7) The order of hospitalization shall state whether the individual
shall be detained for a temporary period not to exceed six months or an
indeterminate period. If hospitalization for a designated temporary period
is ordered, the patient shall not be retained for a longer period unless
upon a hearing held pursuant to this section within such designated
temporary period. Unless otherwise directed by the court, it shall be the
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responsibility of the division of mental health to assure the carrying
out of the order within such period as the court shall specify.
(8) The court is authorized to appoint a mental health commissioner
to assist in the conduct of hospitalization proceedings who shall be an
attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Utah and knowledgeable
about mental health. In any case in which the court refers an application
to the commissioner, the commissioner shall promptly cause the proposed
patient to be examined and on the basis thereof shall either recommend dismissal of the application or hold a hearing as provided in this section and
make findings of fact and recommendations to the court regarding the
order for involuntary hospitalization of the proposed patient.
(9) In the event that the designated examiners are unable, because
of refusal of a proposed patient to submit to an examination, to complete
such examination upon the first attempt to conduct the same, the court
shall fix a reasonable compensation to be paid to such designated examiners
for services in the cause.
(10) Any person hospitalized under this act or his legally designated
representative who is aggrieved by the findings, conclusions and order of
the court, shall have the right to a new hearing upon a petition filed with
the court within thirty days of the entry of the court order. In the event
the petition alleges error or mistake in the medical findings, the court shall
appoint three impartial medical examiners previously unrelated to the
case who shall conduct an additional examination of the patient. The
new hearing shall in all other respects be conducted in the manner otherwise permitted in this act.
(11) Costs of all proceedings under this section shall be paid by the
county in which the proposed patient resides or is found.
History: C. 1943, 85-7-62, enacted by I*.
1951, ch. 113, § 3 ; L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2 ;
1963, ch. 60, § 1; 1967, ch. 174, § 131; 1971,
ch. 172, § 10; 1975, ch. 198, § 22.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1953 amendment inserted subsec. D,
designated former subsecs. D to I as E
to J, and added subsec. K.
The 1963 amendment, in subsec. G, substituted "consistent" for "considered" in
the third sentence and substituted "the
court shall" for "the court may, in its discretion" in the last sentence and, in subd.
H(2), substituted "there is an immediate
danger that the proposed patient will injure himself" for "is likelv to injure himself."
The 1967 amendment substituted "division of mental health" for "department of
public welfare" in subsec. I.
The 1971 amendment substituted "mental health facility" for "mental hospital"
or "hospital" throughout the section; added subsec. L; and made numerous changes
in phraseology, punctuation and style.
The 1973 amendment lrwrote this section which read: "A. Proceedings for the

involuntary hospitalization of sin individual may be commenced by the tiling of a
written application with the district court
of the county in which the proposed patient resides or is found, by a friend, relative, spouse or guardian of the individual,
or by a licensed physician, a health or
public welfare or peace officer, or the head
of any public or private institution in
which such individual may be. Any such
application shall be accompanied by a certificate of a licensed physician stating that
he has examined the individual and is of
the opinion that he is mentally ill and
should be hospitalized, or a written statement by the applicant that the individual
has refused to submit to examination by a
licensed physician; provided, that when an
application is not accompanied by the certificate of a licensed physician, the court
shall proceed in accordance with section
6-1-7-36.5.
"B. Upon receipt of an application the
court shall give notice thereof to the proposed patient, to his legal guardian, if
any, and to his spouse, parents, and nearest known other relative or friend. If,
however, the court has reason to boliovo
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